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Abstract
We analyze the inuence of endogenous competitiveness on multi-
national activity. Competitiveness is endogenized by assuming that
rms di¤er on R&D commitment power, i.e.: some rms are leaders
in R&D. We show that rms with higher commitment power tend to
invest more in R&D and consequently also tend to be more competi-
tive than rivals that lack such capability. As a result, rms with higher
commitment power have higher propensity to become multinationals
than rms with lower commitment power. In addition, the former
use the R&D leader advantage to compel the latter to not enter the
market or, in case of entry, to force them to adopt the domestic strat-
egy. Therefore, in addition to the proximity-concentration trade-o¤,
we identify another FDI determinant: strategic technological compet-
itiveness.
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1 Introduction
According to Markusen (1995, 2002) one of the stylized facts on foreign direct
investment (FDI) is that multinational activity tends to be more important
in industries and rms that have high levels of R&D to sales. In other words,
R&D investment and FDI are positively correlated (see also Grubaugh, 1987;
Morck and Yeung, 1992 and Lin and Yeh, 2005). This is conrmed by Kravis
and Lipseys (1992) empirical study on US multinationals. They show that
high R&D investment by individual rms is associated with high multina-
tional shares and that the international competitiveness of US multinationals
is determined by the level of investment in rm specic assets, such as R&D.
Not surprising then that in the US, multinational rms account for 80% of
total R&D expenditure by private rms (Graham, 1996).
The motivation for this paper comes from the evidence discussed above
on the interrelations between FDI and technological competition. In partic-
ular, we focus on three closely related issues: (1) rmschoice of mode of
foreign entry (export versus horizontal FDI), (2) investment in R&D and
(3) endogenous competitiveness asymmetries between rms. These issues
have so far been dealt with separately in the FDI literature. For example
Horstmann and Markusen (1992) and Rowthorn (1992) look at the decision
between exporting and FDI; Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000) jointly de-
termine FDI and R&D; and Helpman et al. (2004) link FDI with exogenous
rm heterogeneity.
In Horstmann and Markusen (1992) and Rowthorn (1992) rms decide
between exporting (domestic strategy) and establishing a plant in the for-
eign market (multinational strategy). It is assumed that there are xed costs
at rm level (R&D, blueprints, patents and so on), plant-specic xed costs
and increasing returns in production. The choice of the mode of foreign entry
depends on a trade-o¤ between concentration of production (economies of
scale e¤ect) and proximity to consumers (rm size e¤ect, i.e.: multina-
tionals are by assumption bigger, because by avoiding trade costs they can
have higher sales in the destination market). This trade-o¤ is then deter-
mined by the interplay between trade costs and the xed cost of opening a
foreign plant. Accordingly, the multinational option is favored when plant-
specic xed costs are low relatively to trade costs (the so-called proximity-
concentration trade-o¤).
As noted by Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000), besides the scaleand
the rm sizee¤ects, the mode of foreign entry is also a¤ected by a techno-
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logicale¤ect (for example investment in R&D). Having this in mind, Petit
and Sanna-Randaccio (2000) endogenize both the rmsmode of foreign ex-
pansion and R&D investment1. R&D investment is modeled as a cost reduc-
ing activity following Leahy and Neary (1997). Petit and Sanna-Randaccio
(2000) then show that there is a positive relationship between multinational
expansion and R&D investment. In other words, multinational rms invest
more in R&D than domestic rms, because by having preferable access to
foreign markets they have economies of scale in R&D. This allows multi-
nationals to carry out more innovative activities than domestic rms. In
this sense, Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000) endogenize the technological
e¤ect on FDI through exogenous rm sizee¤ects.
Underlying Petit and Sanna-Randaccios (2000) result, but not explicitly
taken into account by them, is the fact that rms are by nature heteroge-
neous. This seems to be particularly important for multinationals. Multina-
tional rms are invariably bigger in size and more productive than domestic
rms (Markusen, 2002 and Helpman et al. 2004). In fact, Helpman et al.
(2004) show that by introducing exogenous productivity di¤erences between
rms, only the more competitive rms become multinational, while the less
competitive ones either do not enter the market or are relegated to the do-
mestic strategy2.
The model of this paper has three building blocks. First, we adopt
Horstmann and Markusens (1992) horizontal FDI framework3. Second, as
in Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000), we introduce process R&D investment
that reduces marginal costs but increases rm-specic xed costs. Third, fol-
lowing Bagwell (1995), we assume that rms di¤er in the capacity to commit
to R&D decisions, i.e.: some rms are leaders in R&D.
Given our modeling strategy, similar to Horstmann and Markusen (1992),
Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000) and Helpman et al. (2004), FDI also arises
as a result of a proximity-concentration trade-o¤. But this is only part of the
story. We show that di¤erences in R&D commitment power add a strategic
1Some other papers analyze only the innovative activities of multinational rms, i.e.:
multinationality is exogenous (see de Bondt et al., 1988; Veugelers and Vanden Houte,
1990; and Wang and Blomstrom, 1992).
2Nocke and Yeaple (2007) and Lu (2007) also analyze the role of rm heterogeneity on
FDI, the former on mergers and acquisitions and the latter on product life cycle dynamics.
3As in Helpman (1984) vertical FDI could be introduced by allowing for international
di¤erences in factor endowments. However, as Ihrigs (2005) empirical study on US FDI
shows, technology issues are more important for horizontal FDI than for vertical FDI.
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technological dimension to the choice of foreign expansion. Accordingly, rms
with higher commitment power, independently of being exporters or multina-
tionals, tend to invest more in R&D and consequently to be more competitive
than rivals that lack such capability4. As a result, higher R&D commitment
power rms have higher propensity to become multinational5. In addition,
rms with higher commitment power use the R&D leader advantage to com-
pel rivals not to enter the market or, in case of entry, to force them to adopt
the domestic strategy. Therefore, in addition to the proximity-concentration
trade-o¤, we identify another FDI determinant: strategic international tech-
nological competitiveness6.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
introduce the base model and dene R&D commitment power. Then we
derive the production equilibrium. In the fourth section we analyze how
R&D and multinational activity a¤ect competitiveness. In the fth section
we derive the entry equilibrium. We conclude by discussing results.
2 The Model
We consider an industry with two potential producer countries (home and
foreign) and a third consumer country where all production is sold7. Each
country hosts one rm, the home rm and the foreign rm, which produce
the same homogenous good. Each rm consists of two physical units: the
headquarters and the production plant. The headquarters are always located
in the country of origin of the rm. The production plant, in turn, can be
located either close to the headquarters (domestic rm) or in the third market
(multinational rm). Accordingly, when a rm chooses the domestic strategy
it serves the third market through exports, while when a rm opts for the
4In this sense, we di¤er from the approach of Helpman et al. (2004) where asymmetries
between rms are exogenous. Our model, however, is much simpler than the one by
Helpman et al. (2004), since we only consider an imperfect competitive duopoly sector.
5Note then that, contrary to Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000), we endogenize the
technologicale¤ect without the need to recur to exogenous rm-sizee¤ects.
6This theoretical prediction seems to be in accordance with Girma and Görgs (2006)
empirical result that the productivity advantage of multinationals is more due to tech-
nologye¤ects rather than to rm sizee¤ects.
7This modeling strategy is usually called the third market model (see Brander and
Spencer, 1985). The third market assumption is made in order to abstract from domestic
consumption.
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multinational strategy it serves the third market through local production.
Since the model is symmetric, in most of the following we concentrate
our attention on the home country. Equations for the foreign country (and
for the foreign rm) apply by symmetry. Foreign variables are indicated by
an asterisk.
The home and the foreign rm face the following indirect demand in the
third country:
Pi;j = a  b
 
qi;j + q

i;j

(1)
where q represents sales of the home rm in the third market and q is
the equivalent for the foreign rm. The sub-scripts (i; j) represent market
structure. Accordingly, i = 0; E;M is the international strategy of the home
rm, where 0 stands for non-entry, E for the exporting strategy andM for the
multinational strategy. Similarly j = 0; E;M is the international strategy
of the foreign rm8. Also, a and b respectively stand for the intercept of
demand and for an inverse measure of market size.
Like in Leahy and Neary (1997), the home and the foreign rm invest in
process R&D that reduces marginal costs (C) but increases xed costs ( )9.
For the home rm this amounts to:
Ci;j = (c  ki;j)
 i;j = 
k2i;j
2
(2)
where k is R&D investment by the home rm,  is the cost-reducing e¤ect of
R&D,  is the cost of R&D and c is the initial marginal cost. The foreign rm
has a similar cost structure with c = c,  =  and  = . The symmetry
in technology is assumed so that competitiveness asymmetries between the
home and the foreign rm can only arise endogenously.
8Then, for example, qM;E is the home rms sales in the third country when the home
rm is a multinational and the foreign rm is an exporter (similarly qM;E is the foreign
rms exports to the third country when the foreign rm is an exporter and the home rm
is a multinational).
9See also Spence (1984) and Spencer and Brander (1983). Contrary to Horstmann
and Markusen (1992) we are then able to endogenize the rm-specic xed costs. This is
particularly important, since rm-specic xed costs intend to represent strategic assets,
such as R&D investment, which can hardly be seen as exogenous.
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We model multinational activity similar to what is standard in the litera-
ture (see Horstmann and Markusen, 1992). In particular, since the multina-
tional strategy demands rms to separate headquarters and production, we
assume that is more costly to operate a plant in the third market than in the
country of origin of the rm. Accordingly, we assume a plant specic xed
cost  that equals G when a rm is an exporter and that equals G, with
 > 1, when a rm is a multinational, i.e.: E = G and M = G.
In this sense the home rms prots can be written as:
i;j = (Pi;j   Ci;j   ti) qi;j    i;j  i (3)
where t = t represents trade costs, which are symmetric for both the home
and the foreign rm. Like in Horstmann andMarkusen (1992), only exporters
face trade costs, i.e.: tE = t > 0 and tM = 0.
2.1 Commitment Power
The concept of commitment power, introduced by Stackelberg (1934), refers
to the strategic advantages of moving before rivals. Bagwell (1995) gives a
precise denition of the assumptions behind games where rms have di¤er-
ences in commitment power. First, moves in the game are sequential with
some players committing to actions before other players select their respec-
tive actions. Second, late-moving players perfectly observe actions selected
by the rst movers.
In this paper we follow Bagwells (1995) denition and apply it to invest-
ment in R&D. Our objective is to analyze the e¤ects of R&D commitment
power di¤erences on multinational activity.
In game terms, a rm has R&D commitment power when it can commit to
the output stage, i.e.: R&D levels are chosen in a previous stage to outputs.
The contrary happens when a rm has no commitment power: the rm sets
outputs and R&D levels simultaneously. Thus, when a rm has commitment
power, it can use R&D to improve productive e¢ ciency and also to a¤ect
the rivals strategic decisions. When a rm does not have R&D commitment
power, it can only use R&D to improve e¢ ciency but not to a¤ect the rivals
strategic choices.
Like in a standard output-Stackelberg-leader set-up, R&D commitment
power, then, gives leader advantages to a rm that competes with a rm
that lacks such capability. However, di¤erently from standard output-leader
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Stage 1 0, E, M
Stage 2 k
Stage 3 q, x, q*, x*, k*
Figure 1: Timing of the Game
models, and as we will show below, rms with di¤erent R&D commitment
capabilities can become endogenously asymmetric in marginal costs, i.e.: our
model endogenizes competitiveness. As we will see, this has important im-
plications in terms of the mode of foreign expansion by rms.
In this sense we assume that only the home rm has R&D commitment
power. The timing of the multinational game is then the following (see gure
1). In the rst stage the home and the foreign rm decide the mode of entry
in the third market (non-entry, export or multinational). In the second stage
the home rm chooses R&D (k). In the third stage the home rm chooses
outputs (q and x) while the foreign rm chooses both outputs (q and x)
and R&D levels (k).
We are now ready to dene the production equilibrium of our model.
3 Production Equilibrium
As usual the game is solved by backward induction. Output expressions are
found by solving for the outputsrst-order conditions (FOCs). However,
since these FOCs depend on market structure, di¤erent output expressions
apply for di¤erent market structure cases. Accordingly, when both rms are
multinationals we have:
qM;M =
D+2kM;M kM;M
3b
qM;M =
D+2kM;M kM;M
3b
(4)
where D = (a  c) is a measure of a rm initial cost competitiveness(i.e.:
without R&D investment).
When both rms are exporters, we obtain:
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qE;E =
D t+2kE;E kE;E
3b
qE;E =
D t+2kE;E kE;E
3b
(5)
If the home rm is an exporter and the foreign rm is a multinational:
qE;M =
D 2t+2kE;M kE;M
3b
qE;M =
D+t+2kE;M kE;M
3b
(6)
If the home rm is a multinational and the foreign rm is an exporter:
qM;E =
D+t+2kM;E kM;E
3b
qM;E =
D 2t+2kM;E kM;E
3b
(7)
In turn, if the home rm has a multinational monopoly we get:
qM;0 =
D+kM;0
2b
(8)
And if the home rm has an exporting monopoly it results in:
qE;0 =
D t+kE;0
2b
(9)
Obviously, the expressions q0;M and q

0;E are exactly the same as qM;0 and
qE;0, with kM;0 substituted for k0;M and kE;0 substituted for k

0;E, respectively.
To derive the R&D expressions we can proceed in the same way as for out-
puts by working with the FOCs for R&D investment. These FOCs however
depend on market structure (in particular on whether we are in the presence
of a monopoly or a duopoly) and on commitment power (i.e.: whether a rm
has commitment power or not). In this sense, it can be helpful to write down
the general R&Ds FOC for the home rm:
di;j
dki;j
=
@i;j
@ki;j
+
@i;j
@qi;j
dqi;j
dki;j
(10)
A similar expression holds for the foreign rm. The rst and second terms
on the right hand side of equation 10 are usually called the non strategic and
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the strategic motive for R&D, respectively (see Leahy and Neary, 1997)10.
Two situations can be identied related with these two terms: rst, when a
rm has commitment power and has a rival rm (i.e.: the home rm in the
duopoly cases); and second, when a rm has either no R&D commitment
power or is a monopolist (i.e.: the foreign rm in all duopoly cases and the
home and the foreign rm in the monopoly cases, respectively). When a rm
has no commitment power or is a monopolist, the second term in equation
10 vanishes, i.e.: R&D investment is non strategic. If, on the contrary, a
rm has commitment power and has a rival, the second term is non-zero,
i.e.: R&D investment is strategic.
We then have that the foreign rms R&D expressions, independently of
market structure, are always equal to:
ki;j =


qi;j, for j 6= 0 and i = 0; E;M (11)
In turn, R&D expressions for the home rm can take two forms. The rst
holds in the monopoly market structures where the home rm has a similar
R&D expression to that of the foreign rm:
ki;0 =


qi;0, for i = E;M (12)
The second holds in the duopoly cases, where R&D by the home rm is:
ki;j =
4
3
qi;j, for i; j 6= 0 (13)
We can then see that in the duopoly cases, the home and the foreign rm
have asymmetric incentives to invest in R&D (see equations 11 and 13). This
results from the home and the foreign rm having asymmetric R&D com-
mitment power levels. Accordingly, di¤erences in R&D commitment power
create endogenous competitiveness asymmetries between the home and the
foreign rm. In particular, the home rm (the rm with higher commitment
power) over-invests by a proportion of 4=3 relatively to the foreign rm (the
rm with no commitment power)11.
10Note that the whole R&Ds FOC for the home rm is: ddk =
@
@k +
@
@q
dq
dk +
@
@q
dq
dk .
However, from the outputs FOC we have that @@q = 0.
11This is so because in Cournot competition outputs are strategic substitutes (see Bulow
et al. 1985), i.e.: if q increases, q decreases (and in consequence also the home rms
prots). But since when k increases, q decreases, then @@q
dq
dk =

3q > 0, i.e.: the strategic
e¤ect of R&D is positive for the home rm.
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The important thing to note is that over-investment in R&D by the home
rm intends not only to discourage entry by the foreign rm (as in Fudenberg
and Tirole, 1984), but also in case of entry to a¤ect the foreign rms mode
of entry (export versus FDI). In other words, in case the foreign rm enters
the market, the home rm prefers that the foreign rm enters as a domestic
rm and not as a multinational.
We can now solve for the explicit output and R&D expressions for the
di¤erent market structure cases to obtain:
qM;M =
3D(1 )
b(9 2(7 2))
qM;M =
D(3 4)
b(9 2(7 2))
kM;M =
4D(1 )
b(9 2(7 2))
kM;M =
D(3 4)
b(9 2(7 2))
qE;E =
3(D t)(1 )
b(9 2(7 2))
qE;E =
(D t)(3 4)
b(9 2(7 2))
kE;E =
4(D t)(1 )
b(9 2(7 2))
kE;E =
(D t)(3 4)
b(9 2(7 2))
qE;M =
3((D t)(1 ) t)
b(9 2(7 2))
qE;M =
D(3 4)+3t
b(9 2(7 2))
kE;M =
4((D t)(1 ) t)
b(9 2(7 2))
kE;M =
(D(3 4)+3t)
b(9 2(7 2))
qM;E =
3(D(1 )+t)
b(9 2(7 2))
qM;E =
(D t)(3 4) 3t
b(9 2(7 2))
kM;E =
4(D(1 )+t)
b(9 2(7 2))
kM;E =
((D t)(3 4) 3t)
b(9 2(7 2))
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qM;0 =
D
b(2 )
kM;0 =
D
b(2 )
qE;0 =
D t
b(2 )
kE;0 =
(D t)
b(2 ) (14)
We restrict the parameter space so that trade costs do not forbid exports.
If we assume otherwise, our model would be biased for the multinational
strategy. It can easily be checked that in order to have trade in all market
structure congurations we just need to guarantee that qM;E > 0, or:
t^ < (3 4)D
2(3 2)
0 < ^ < 3
4
(15)
The second equation above also assures that all second-order conditions
(SOCs) are always satised (see appendix).
4 R&D, Multinationals and Competitiveness
The model in this paper can then predict asymmetric R&D patterns even
with initially symmetric rms. As we mentioned above, what drives this
result is di¤erences in R&D commitment power, that endogenize competi-
tiveness asymmetries between the home and the foreign rm.
In this section we are going to show that the rm with higher commitment
power (the home rm) tends to invest more in R&D and to produce more
than the rm with lower commitment power (the foreign rm). As a result
the home rm also tends to be more competitive and bigger in size than the
foreign rm.
To see this, note rst that the home rm always has a competitiveness
advantage over the foreign rm when the two rms have symmetric entry
strategies (multinational and exporting duopolies) or the home rm is a
multinational and the foreign rm is an exporter (see appendix):
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kM;M > k

M;M and qM;M > q

M;M
kE;E > k

E;E and qE;E > q

E;E
kM;E > k

M;E and qM;E > q

M;E (16)
Furthermore, even when the home rm is in disadvantage in the entry
strategy (i.e.: (E;M) market structure) it is possible for the home rm to
be more competitive than the foreign rm if trade costs are not very high:
kE;M > k

E;M , if t <
D
11 4 and qE;M > q

E;M , if t <
D
3(3 ) (17)
Not surprising then, that a multinational rm with commitment power
that faces a domestic rm with no commitment power ((M;E) market struc-
ture) is more competitive and bigger in size than a multinational rm with
no commitment power that faces a domestic rm with commitment power
((E;M) market structure):
kM;E > k

E;M and qM;E > q

E;M (18)
Proposition 1 In an international duopoly, a rm with higher commitment
power tends to be more competitive than a rm with lower commitment power.
As we will see in the next section this endogenous competitiveness asym-
metry property has important consequences in the entry decisions of both
the home and the foreign rm.
5 Equilibrium Market Structure
To study the entry decision of the home and the foreign rm we have rst
to dene rmsprots under the di¤erent market structure congurations.
We start with the monopoly cases since a monopolist always has the same
prots independently of R&D commitment power:
M;0 = 

0;M =
(2 )D2
2b(2 )2   G
E;0 = 

0;E =
(2 )(D t)2
2b(2 )2  G (19)
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In the duopoly cases, in turn, the home and the foreign rm will have
di¤erent prot levels, since di¤erences in R&D commitment power make
them endogenously asymmetric:
M;M =
(9 8)D2(1 )2
b(9 2(7 2))2   G
E;E =
(9 8)(D t)2(1 )2
b(9 2(7 2))2  G
E;M =
(9 8)((D t)(1 ) t)2
b(9 2(7 2))2  G
M;E =
(9 8)(D(1 )+t)2
b(9 2(7 2))2   G
M;M =
(2 )D2(3 4)2
2b(9 2(7 2))2   G
E;E =
(2 )(D t)2(3 4)2
2b(9 2(7 2))2  G
E;M =
(2 )((3 4)D+3t)2
2b(9 2(7 2))2   G
M;E =
(2 )((3 4)(D t) 3t)2
2b(9 2(7 2))2  G (20)
To derive the entry equilibrium, however, it is not su¢ cient to just have
the prot equations. We also need to compute rmspreferences over di¤erent
market structure congurations. In fact, as shown in gure 2, the Nash
solution of the entry stage is a three-by-three matrix with three strategic
choices (non-entry, export and multinational) and two players (the home
and the foreign rm). Then, we also have to compare for the home rm
M;M with E;M , M;E with E;E, and M;0 with E;0; and for the foreign
rm M;M with 

M;E, 

E;M with 

E;E, and 

0;M with 

0;E. In other words,
in addition to equations 19 to 20 we also need to compute:
M;M   E;M = (9  8) t2D(2 (3 )) t(4 (4 ))b(9 2(7 2))2  G (  1)
M;E   E;E = (9  8) t2D(2 (3 ))+t(2 )b(9 2(7 2))2  G (  1)
M;0   E;0 = 0;M   0;E = t 2D t2(2 )b  G (  1)
M;M   M;E = 2 (2  ) t (D t)(9 4(3 )) 2D(3 2)b(9 2(7 2))2  G (  1)
E;M   E;E = 2 (2  ) tD(9 2(9 4))+2t(3 2)b(9 2(7 2))2  G (  1) (21)
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Foreign
Home
M E 0
M PM,M, P*M,M PM,E, P*M,E PM,0, 0
E PE,M, P*E,M PE,E, P*E,E PE,0, 0
0 0, P*0,M 0, P*0,E 0,0
Figure 2: Entry Prot Matrix
We are now able to derive the entry equilibrium. Before that, however, we
perform two comparative static exercises. First, we analyze the role of trans-
port costs (t), plant-specic xed costs (G) and the return on R&D () on
the entry decision of rms. Second, we look at a hypothetical scenario where
rms cannot choose between export versus multinational but only between
export versus non-entry or between multinational versus non-entry. This ex-
ercise can give us some insights into the role of competitiveness asymmetries
on the mode of entry chosen by rms.
5.1 Transport Costs, Plant-Specic Fixed Costs and
Return on R&D
We study the role of t, G and  on the entry decisions of the home and the
foreign rm by looking at equations 19 to 21. Four patterns arise.
First, for both the home and the foreign rm, the multinational strategy
is penalized for high G, and the reverse for the export strategy.
Second, as shown in appendix, also for both the home and the foreign
rm, the exporting strategy is penalized for high t, and the contrary for the
multinational strategy:
dE;j
dt
< 0 and
di;E
dt
< 0 with i; j = 0; E;M
dM;j
dt
> 0 and
di;M
dt
> 0 with i; j = 0; E;M
dM;j E;j
dt
> 0 and
di;M i;E
dt
> 0 with i; j = 0; E;M (22)
Third, in the duopoly cases, increases in  in general penalize the foreign
rm. Only in the (E;M) market structure might this not be the case if  is
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su¢ ciently low. The contrary happens with the home rm. In general, the
home rm benets from increases in . The only exception is the (E;M)
market structure, where for su¢ ciently low , prots by the home rm may
decrease with  (see appendix):
dM;M
d
> 0, dE;E
d
> 0 and dM;E
d
> 0
dE;M
d
> 0 for high , dE;M
d
< 0 for low 
dM;M
d
< 0,
dE;E
d
< 0 and
dM;E
d
< 0
dE;M
d
< 0 for high ,
dE;M
d
> 0 for low  (23)
In turn, for the monopoly cases, prots always increase with  for both
the home and the foreign rm (see appendix).
Fourth, in the duopoly cases, for the home rm increases in  promote
the multinational strategy relatively to the exporting one. For the foreign
rm, in general the opposite occurs except when  is su¢ ciently low (see
appendix):
dM;j E;j
d
> 0 with i; j = E;M
di;M i;E
d
< 0 for high ,
di;M i;E
d
> 0 for low , with i; j = E;M (24)
In the monopoly cases, an increase in  always promotes the multinational
strategy relatively to the exporting one.
Proposition 2 In an international duopoly, higher t and lower G promote
the multinational strategy over the export one. In turn, for the rm with
higher commitment power, higher  tends to promote: international activity
(export and multinational) and favour the multinational strategy over the
export one. The reverse happens for the rm with lower commitment power.
We can then see that while G and t work symmetrically for the home and
the foreign rm, the opposite happens with the parameter . The reason for
this asymmetry in behavior is commitment power asymmetries in R&D. For
high , the rm with higher commitment power (the home rm) can more
easily impose the leader advantages on the rmwith lower commitment power
(the foreign rm).
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Figure 3: Export versus Non-Entry
5.2 Export, Multinational and Non-Entry
From equations 19 to 21 it is also possible to derive the threshold lev-
els of G that make a market structure protable. We denominate these
plant-specic threshold levels as respectively: G^M;0 = G^0;M , G^E;0 = G^

0;E,
G^M;M , G^M;M , G^E;E, G^

E;E, G^E;M , G^

E;M , G^M;E, G^

M;E, G^M;M E;M , G^M;E E;E,
G^M;0 E;0, G^M;M M;E and G^

E;M E;E.
If rms can only choose between exporting and non-entry, the relation
between G^E;0, G^E;E and G^E;E is going to be (see appendix):
G^E;0 > G^E;E > G^

E;E (25)
In other words, as shown in gure 3, for G > G^E;0 there will be no entry
((0; 0)); if G^E;E < G < G^E;0 either the home or the foreign rm will have an
export monopoly ((0; E) or (E; 0)); if G^E;E < G < G^E;E the home rm will
have an export monopoly ((E; 0)); and if G < G^E;E there will be an export
duopoly ((E;E)).
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Figure 4: Multinational versus Non-Entry
Similarly, if rms can only choose between the multinational strategy and
non-entry, the relation between G^M;0, G^M;M and G^M;M is (see appendix):
G^M;0 > G^M;M > G^

M;M (26)
Accordingly, as shown in gure 4, for G > G^M;0 there will be no entry
((0; 0)); if G^M;M < G < G^M;0 either the home or the foreign rm will have a
multinational monopoly ((0;M) or (M; 0)); if G^M;M < G < G^M;M the home
rm will have a multinational monopoly ((M; 0)); and if G < G^M;M there
will be a multinational duopoly ((M;M)).
Proposition 3 In an international duopoly, the decision between export ver-
sus non-entry and multinational versus non-entry depends on R&D commit-
ment power. Su¢ ciently low G promotes symmetric duopoly equilibriums,
medium-low G promotes multinational or exporting monopolies by the rm
with higher commitment power (home rm), medium-high G promotes multi-
national or exporting monopolies by either the home or the foreign rm, while
very high G promotes non-entry.
17
In the previous exercise, there are two equilibriums that make our model
more directly comparable with the one by Helpman et al. (2004): (E; 0) and
(M; 0). Accordingly, in these two equilibriums only the more competitive rm
(the home rm) enters the market, while the less competitive one (the foreign
rm) is not able to face competition. As such, like in Helpman et al. (2004)
we can also show that depending on market conditions (i.e.: G) the more
competitive rms have more chances to become exporters or multinationals.
5.3 Entry Equilibrium
The entry equilibrium in our model is, however, more complicated than
merely the decision between export versus non-entry and multinational ver-
sus non-entry. We also need to consider the multinational versus the export-
ing strategy. Using the relations in the entry prot matrix (gure 2) it is
possible to construct the entry equilibrium in the (G; t) space as shown in
gures 5, 6 and 7. Figure 5 arises for high values of , while gures 6 and 7
arise for low  (gure 7 shows a detail of gure 6)12.
As can be seen from gures 5 to 7, the solution of the entry stage shares
some similarities with other FDI models, such as Horstmann and Markusen
(1992) and Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000). In the rst place, due to the
modeling strategy adopted, our model also displays the proximity concen-
tration trade-o¤: for high trade costs and low plant specic xed costs the
multinational strategy is preferred; while for high plant specic xed costs
and low trade costs the exporting strategy is favored.
There are also some di¤erences, however. First, our model predicts
three market structure equilibriums not possible in either Horstmann and
Markusen (1992) or Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000): (E; 0), (M; 0) and
(M;E). Contrary to what happens with all market structure equilibriums in
Horstmann and Markusen (1992) and Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000), the
previously mentioned equilibriums are single Nash equilibriums13. As such,
12Figures 5, 6 and 7 depict the following prot curves (colors indicated in parenthesis):
M;M and M;M (black), E;E and 

E;E (blue), E;M and 

E;M (brown), M;E and
M;E (cyan), M;0 (orange), E;0 (dark green), M;M   E;M and M;M   M;E (ma-
genta), M;E E;E and E;M  E;E (light green), M;0 E;0 (red). The home rms
prots curves are represented by solid lines while the foreign ones by dash lines. Figure 5
is constructed with D = 20, b = 1,  = 2 and  = 0:2; and gures 6 and 7 with D = 20,
b = 1,  = 2 and  = 0:1.
13Horstmann and Markusen (1992) predict the following market structures in equilib-
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N: No-Nash equilibrium
Figure 5: Entry Equilibrium: High 
asymmetries on commitment power reduce the indeterminacy in the solution
of the market structure equilibrium.
In addition, the market structure (E;M), which only arises in Petit and
Sanna-Randaccio (2000) together with the (M;E) market structure, only
emerges in our model for low values of  (see gures 6 and 7). Then, a
multinational rm that has no commitment power nds it di¢ cult to com-
pete successfully with a domestic rm with commitment power. This shows,
as already mentioned in a previous section, that the rm with higher com-
mitment power (the home rm) uses R&D strategically to a¤ect the entry
choices of the rm with lower commitment power (the foreign rm). In par-
ticular, the home rm over-invests in R&D to restrict entry or, in case of
entry, to force the foreign rm to adopt the domestic strategy.
In this sense, like in Helpman et al. (2004), here competitiveness asym-
metries between rms also plays an important role in connection with rms
entry-FDI decisions. In the previous subsection we discussed the impor-
rium: (0; 0), (E; 0)(0; E), (E;E), (M; 0)(0;M), (M;M) and (E;E)(M; 0)(0;M). Petit
and Sanna-Randaccio (2000) also have (M;E)(E;M) and no Nash equilibrium.
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Figure 6: Entry Equilibrium: Low 
tance of competitiveness in explaining the emergence of the market structures
(E; 0) and (M; 0). We can also see the same e¤ects at work in the (M;E)
market structure. Depending on market conditions (G and t), it is possi-
ble that only the more competitive rm can become a multinational while
the less competitive one can only aspire to be an exporter. Then, similarly
to Helpman et al. (2004), also in our paper competitiveness asymmetries
between rms can separate multinationals from exporters.
The di¤erence relative to Helpman et al. (2004) is that in the present
paper asymmetries between rms are endogenous. Accordingly, for high
return on R&D (gure 5), the rm with higher commitment power can more
easily impose the R&D leader advantage. In turn, for low return on R&D
(gures 6 and 7) the rm with lower commitment power can more easily
face the rm with higher commitment power. As a result, when the return
on R&D () is very low, new mixed equilibriums arise: (E;E)(M; 0)(0;M),
(E;E)(M; 0) and (E;M)(M; 0). Of these three equilibriums only the rst
one has been uncovered previously by Horstmann and Markusen (1992) and
Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000).
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In our view, however, the important thing to notice is that while the
proximity-concentration trade-o¤ works symmetrically for both the home
and the foreign rm, the technologicale¤ect (that runs through ) a¤ects
the two rms asymmetrically: high return on R&D favours the rm with
higher commitment power rm (the home rm) more than the rm with
lower commitment power (the foreign rm), and the reverse when the return
on R&D is very low. In this sense, this paper then introduces a new FDI
determinant: strategic international technological competitiveness.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the interrelation between FDI, R&D and en-
dogenous asymmetries between rms. We have introduced endogenous com-
petitiveness asymmetries by assuming that rms di¤er in R&D commitment
power. Accordingly, we show that a rm with higher commitment power
tends to invest more in R&D, and therefore, tends to be more competitive,
than a rm with lower commitment power. The competitiveness advantage
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of the rm with higher commitment power, in turn, increases the chances of
becoming a multinational. In other words, the technologicale¤ect can be
more important than rm sizee¤ects for the multinational choice.
In addition, a rm with higher commitment power plays strategically
against a rm with lower commitment power in order to a¤ect the rivals
entry decision. In particular, the former over-invest in R&D in order to force
the latter to not enter, or at least to relegate the competitor to the domestic
strategy.
As a result, while high trade costs promote the multinational strategy and
higher plant-specic xed costs promote the exporting strategy, the return
on R&D has opposite e¤ects on the higher and on the lower R&D com-
mitment power rms. Higher return on R&D favors the rm with higher
commitment power over the rm with lower commitment power. Low re-
turn on R&D in turn mitigates the R&D leader advantages of the rm with
higher commitment power. In addition, higher return on R&D promotes the
rm with higher commitment power to become multinational while it pro-
motes the rm with lower commitment power to become domestic. What
this means is that although the proximity-concentration trade-o¤ a¤ects all
rms symmetrically, the technologicale¤ect a¤ects rms asymmetrically.
There are several issues that are disregarded in our paper. First we do
not consider the question of the location of R&D (see for example Ekholm
and Hakkala, 2007). Second, we do not take into account the welfare policies
directed either to attract FDI or to promote R&D (see Sanna-Randaccio,
2002). Also, our framework should be extended to a more general context
(as in Helpman, 2004). Future work should aim at incorporating these issues
in the model introduced here.
A Appendix
R&D Second-Order Condition For the home rm in all the duopoly
cases we obtain:
d2i;j
dk2i;j
=  (9 8)
9
< 0 for i; j 6= 0 (27)
For the foreign rm in all the duopoly cases we obtain:
d2i;j
d(ki;j)
2 =   (3 2)3 < 0 for i; j 6= 0 (28)
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In turn, in all the monopoly cases we have:
d2i;j
dk2i;j
=
d2i;j
d(ki;j)
2 =  (2 )2 < 0 for i or j = 0 (29)
Then, the most restricted SOC is 0 <  < 9
8
.
Proof of Proposition 1 The following relations hold as long as 0 <  < 3
4
:
kM;M   kM;M = Db(9 2(7 2)) > 0
kE;E   kE;E = (D t)b(9 2(7 2)) > 0
kM;E   kM;E =  D+t(10 4)b(9 2(7 2)) > 0
qM;M   qM;M = Db(9 2(7 2)) > 0
qE;E   qE;E = (D t)b(9 2(7 2)) > 0
qM;E   qM;E = D+t(9 4)b(9 2(7 2)) > 0
qM;E   qE;M = Db(9 2(7 2)) > 0
kM;E   kE;M = (D+t)b(9 2(7 2)) > 0 (30)
The following relations also hold if and only if:
kE;M   kE;M = (D t(11 4))b(9 2(7 2)) > 0 i¤ t < D11 4
qE;M   qE;M = D t(9 3)b(9 2(7 2)) > 0 i¤ t < D3(3 ) (31)
Proof of Proposition 2
Prots versus trade costs For multinationals:
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dM;0
dt
=
dM;M
dt
=
dM;M
dt
= 0
dM;E
dt
= 2(9 8)(D(1 )+t)
b(9 2(7 2))2 > 0
dE;M
dt
= 3(2 )(D(3 4)+3t)
b(9 2(7 2))2 > 0 (32)
For exporters:
dE;0
dt
=   D t
(2 )b < 0
dE;E
dt
=  2(9 8)(D t)(1 )2
b(9 2(7 2))2 < 0
dE;M
dt
=  2(9 8)((D t)(1 ) t)(2 )
b(9 2(7 2))2 < 0
dE;E
dt
=   (2 )(D t)(3 4)2
b(9 2(7 2))2 < 0
dM;E
dt
=  2(2 )((D t)(3 4) 3t)(3 2)
b(9 2(7 2))2 < 0 (33)
For multinational versus exporting strategy:
d(M;M E;M)
dt
= 2(9 8)(D(2 (3 )) t(4 (4 )))
b(9 2(7 2))2 > 0
d(M;E E;E)
dt
= 2(9 8)(D(2 (3 ))+t(2 ))
b(9 2(7 2))2 > 0
d(M;0 E;0)
dt
= D t
(2+)b
> 0
d(M;M M;E)
dt
= 2(2 )(D(9 2(9 4)) 2t(9 4(3 )))
b(9 2(7 2))2 > 0
d(E;M E;E)
dt
= 2(2 )(D(9 2(9 4))+4t(3 2))
b(9 14+42)2 > 0 (34)
Prots versus Return on R&D For the monopoly cases:
dM;0
d
= D
2
4(2 )2b > 0
dE;0
d
= (D t)
2
2(2 )2b > 0 (35)
For the home rm:
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dM;M
d
= D
2(1 )(9 4(5 (7 4)))
b(9 2(7 2))3 > 0
dE;E
d
= 2(D t)
2(1 )(9 4(5 (7 4)))
b(9 2(7 2))3 > 0
dM;E
d
= (D(1 )+t)(D(9 (20 4(7 4)))+t(90 16(8 3)))
b(9 2(7 2))3 > 0
dE;M
d
= 2((D t)(1 ) t)(D(9 4(5 (7 4))) t(99 4(37 (19 4))))
b(9 2(7 2))3 ? 0
< 0 for low  and > 0 for high  (36)
For the foreign rm:
dM;M
d
=  D2(3 4)(3+2(15 2(11 4)))
4b(9 2(7 2))3 < 0
dE;E
d
=   (D t)2(3 4)(3+2(15 2(11 4)))
2b(9 2(7 2))3 < 0
dM;E
d
=   ((D t)(3 4) 3t)(D(3+(30 (44 16)))+t(138 (168 (80 16))))
2b(9 2(7 2))3 < 0
dE;M
d
=   (D(3 4)+3t)(D(3+2(15 2(11 4))) t(141 2(69 18)))
4b(9 2(7 2))3 ? 0
> 0 for low  and < 0 for high  (37)
For the home rm, multinational versus exporting strategy:
d(M;M E;M)
d
= 2tD(117 4(74 (75 2(19 4)))) t(198 (395 4(75 (27 4))))
b(9 2(7 2))3 > 0
d(M;E E;E)
d
= 2t
D(117 4(74 (75 2(19 4))))+t(81 (99 42(11 4)))
b(9 2(7 2))3 > 0
d(M;0 E;0)
d
= t 2D t
2(2 )2b > 0 (38)
For the foreign rm, multinational versus exporting strategy:
d(M;M M;E)
d
= 2tD(99 2(153 2(81 8(5 )))) t(207 2(195 4(36 (13 2))))
b(9 2(7 2))3 7 0
d(E;M E;E)
d
= 2tD(99 2(153 2(81 8(5 ))))+4t(27 (21+(9 2(7 2))))
b(9 2(7 2))3 7 0
> 0 for low  and < 0 for high  (39)
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Proof of Proposition 3 Export versus non-entry:
G^E;0   G^E;E = (D t)
2(45 2(65 (58 15)))
2(2 )b(9 2(7 2))2 > 0
G^E;E   G^E;E = (5 6)(D t)
2
2b(9 2(7 2))2 > 0 (40)
Multinational versus non-entry:
G^M;0   G^M;M = D2(45 2(65 (58 15)))2b(2 )(9 2(7 2))2 > 0
G^M;M   G^M;M = (5 6)D
2
2b(9 2(7 2))2 > 0 (41)
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